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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
when such inspection will not interfere
with Department use.
D. Arrest reports, arrest records, supple-
mentary reports and photographs will
not be open for inspection to representatives
of the press or other news media.
E. From the time a person is arrested until the
proceeding has been terminated by trial or
olherwise, the following types of information
will not be made available to the press or news
media:
1. Observations about an arrestee's charac-
ter or prior criminal record.
2. Statements, admissions, confessions, or
alibis attributable to an arrestee.
3. Results of investigative procedures
such as fingerprints, polygraph examina-
tions, ballistics tests, laboratory tests,
or showups.
4. Statements concerning the identity,
credibility, or testimony of prospective
witnesses.
5. Statements concerning evidence or
argument in the case, whether or not
it is anticipated that such evidence or
argument will be used at trial.
F. Members of the Department, subject to
the limitations imposed in paragraph
li-E, may release the following infor-
mation to the press or news media:
iY The arrestee's name, age, residence,
employment, marital status, and similar
background information.
2. The substance or text of the charge,
such as a complaint or indictment.
3. The identity of the investigating and
arresting unit and the length of the
investigation.
4. The circumstances immediately sur-
rounding an arrest, including the time
and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit,
possession and use of weapons, and a
description of items seized at the time
of arrest.
G. The officer in charge of an investigation
or other incident involving the police will
impose restrictions on access to the crime
scene, or the release or information by
subordinates when he believes it necessary
for the success of the investigation. Mem-
bers of the Department will seek the co-
operation of news media representatives
in such matters.
H. Arrest records and photographs in the
Inquiry and Identification Section files
may be released only by order of the Super-
intendent or his delegated representative.
I. Members of the Department will take no
action to encourage or assist news media
in photographing or filming a person being
held or transported in police custody.
J. The provisions of this order are not in-
tended to restrict the release of infor-
mation which may be helpful in, effecting
the arrest of a person who is a fugitive
from justice.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS
BARRY SIEGAL
Assume that a defendant is tried and convicted
of murder in the second degree, but on appeal his
conviction is reversed on the basis of a prosecution
induced procedural error at trial. Can he be
retried for the same offense, consistent with his
Fifth Amendment right against being twice put
in -jeopardy? According to a longstanding rule
the state has the power to retry a defendant under
these circumstances. But has this always been the
law, and what was the rationale in establishing it?
Under the common law autrefois acquit and
autrefois convict, or what we now know as former
jeopardy, were pleas available to defendants,
reflecting a policy of finality as to cases already
decided on their merits. In England the courts
held that this policy required that a defendant
convicted of a felony could not request a writ of
error and also ask for a new trail. In other words,
if the error was substantial enough the verdict
was reversed and the prosecution could not retry
the defendant. Otherwise, the verdict stood.
I Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials
and Successive Prosecutions, 74 H.uv. L. Rv. 1, 4
(1960).
BARRY SIEGAL
The framers of the United States Constitution
quickly realized the importance of the maxim:
"no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his
life more than once for the same offense," 2 and
incorporated it into their final draft.' They were
struck, on the other hand, by the harshness,
both from the point of view of the state and the
defense, of the rule forbidding a retrial after
reversal. 4 That is, the state is clearly prejudiced
if it is foreclosed from seeking a new trial where a
conviction has been reversed because of a pro-
cedural error. The defendant may also be hurt
where the appellate court is reluctant to overturn
a verdict, knowing if they do the defendant will
go free.
The first time the Supreme Court considered
the question of whether the Constitution was
intended to accord with the English rule barring
retrial was in United States v. Gilbert.5 There the
Court felt compelled to follow English precedent
since the Constitution gave no indication of a
contrary intent. Most American courts have since
rejected this construction of the Fifth Amend-
ment, and in United States v. Ball,6 the Supreme
Court overruled Gilbert, holding that when a
defendant has a conviction set aside he may be
retried for the same offense.
The Ball doctrine has received unanimous
approval throughout the country, though there is a
difference of opinion as to the rationale supporting
it. The most predominant theory seems to be
that the defendant, by successfully appealing his
prior conviction, has "waived" the protection
against being retried for the same offenseY This
idea has been rejected by some authorities since
it connotes a voluntary act, whereas, it is per-
fectly clear the defendant cannot exercise a free
uncoerced choice in this situation.8
2BLACKSTONE, Coi.rs xTrEs 335.
'U.S. CONST. amend. V. Protection against doublejeopardy can also be found in 41 state constitutions.
See Kneir, Prosecutions Under State Law and Municipal
Ordinances as Double Jeopardy, 16 CoRNELL L.Q. 201
(1931).4 Mayers and Yarbrough, supra note 1, at p. 4.
5 25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
6 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
7 E.g. MILLER, CRnawm L LAW, 534 (1937).
S Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Cf.
VanAlstyne, In Gideons Wake: Harslier Penalties And
The "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J.
606, 627 (1965). The author insists that to say that a
successful criminal appellant must "waive" a formerjeopardy plea "is either to deny that the protection is
absolute or maintain that one can be required to forfeit
a constitutional right to absolute protection for the
privilege of appeal. (Holmes felt that it would be in-
Mr. Justice Holmes, more logically but still
in the realm of legal fiction, considered the problem
to be one of continuing jeopardy. That is, jeopardy
may be thought of as continuing until the "final"
settlement of any one prosecution. 9 This notion
has yet to be accepted by the Supreme Court
since its position has been, at least in federal cases,
that once an accused has been acquitted the govern-
ment can not appeal, even though there has been
substantial legal error at trial.10
The actual reason why double jeopardy does
not attach where the defendant appeals a prior
conviction because of an error at trial is that the
policy behind the guarantee is not applicable
in that situation. There seems to be no valid
reason for unconditionally releasing the defendant
simply because there was some error committed
at the first trail, at least absent a showing that
retrial would amount to unreasonable harassment
of the defendant." The purpose of the double
jeopardy clause is not one of providing absolute
immunity from reprosecution, but only unreason-
able reprosecution. 2
How Many Trials?
The courts have never determined whether the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments are transgressed
merely because a defendant is tried several times.
In Palko v. Connecticut" the Supreme Court,
conceivable to force a defendant to give up valuable
rights expressly granted by the Constitution in order
to enable him to correct a fatal error. Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (dissenting opinion).)
9 Kepner v. United States, supra note 8. Holmes,
therefore, felt that the accused was not twice placed
in jeopardy whether the error on trial was in favor of
the accused or the government.
10 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
" Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 625. Even assuming
that a retrial after reversal because of prosecution's
error is not unreasonable, a question remains as to
whether reprosecution after government appeal be-
cause of defense error violates this standard. The Court
in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), upheld
such a practice, apparently acknowledging a deference
to the state's determination of this question. A similar
federal situation was held unconstitutional. See, Kep-
ner v. United States, supra note 10.
12 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
13 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The majority reasoned that
the state was not trying to wear down the defendant
with a multitude of trials, thereby implying that in
some situations it may be constitutionally impermissi-
ble to retry a defendant if to do so would be unreasona-
ble. This dicta does not seem to have been taken very
seriously by other federal courts, however. For example,
in United States ex rel. Hentenyi v. Wilkens, 348 F.2d.
844 (1965) the Second Circuit allowed the state to
retry the defendant four times where the only reason
for the retrials was the state's own errors. If this does
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although upholding the practice of state appeal
under the circumstances, did indicate that there
may be some point where the number of trials
could become unconstitutionally burdensome.
In Ciucci v. Illinois,14 the court was faced with a
situation where the defendant was indicted four
different times for four different murders, although
all occurred at the same time and place and the
same evidence was introduced at all four trials.
The majority upheld the validity of this practice
since the defendant-under the statute-had
committed three distinct offenses notwithstanding
the fact that the violations were compendiously
committed in a single transaction. This decision
has been criticized since it presented one of the
most objectionable double jeopardy situations.
That is, it appears that the subsequent trials
were the result of the prosecutor's determination
to secure a death sentence regardless of the effort
necessary. This seems hardly a sufficient state
interest to overcome the elements of harassment,
inordinate vexation, and great expense to the
defendant which were all present as a result of
the number of trials.i
Illinois, however, is one state which has realized
the harshness of the Ciucci decision and has
modified it somewhat by statute. Its Criminal
Code provides: a) when the same conduct of
a defendant may establish the commission of more
than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted
for each such offense and b) if the several offenses
are known to the proper prosecuting officer at
the time of commencing prosecution and are
within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must
be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except that
the court may in the interest of justice order that
one or more charges shall be tried separately.
Further, a subsequent trial will be barred if for an
offense with which the defendant should have
been charged in a former prosecution under b). 6
In one case, where the Illinois Supreme Court
interpreted these provisions, it was held that a
defendant could not be separately indicted for two
different murders occurring in the same transaction,
where his participation was as co-conspirator and
the second trial was admittedly for the purpose of
obtaining greater punishment.17
not violate due process it is difficult to conceive of a
multiple trial situation that does.
14 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
15 Comment, 70 DicK. L. REv. 377, 389 (1966).
1 6 ILL. REv. STAT. ch 38, Sec. 3-3 and 3-4 (1961).
17 People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68
(1965). The court here distinguished the facts before it
People v. Piatt'8 presented another opportunity
for the Illinois courts to liberalize the rights of a
defendant. There, the defendant was indicted on a
charge of drag racing in violation of a state statute.
Prior to trial the prosecution voluntarily dismissed
the information and subsequently filed another
charging the defendant with reckless driving.
The court of appeals affirmed a dismissal of the
charge, holding that enactment of the statute
was not merely a prohibition against double
jeopardy already found in state and Federal
constitutions. Rather, it is "concerned with the
situation in which more than one offense is found
to arise out of the same conduct or the same act
and the defense of double jeopardy is unavailable.
Clearly, therefore, it is immaterial whether
jeopardy has attached to the first charge." 19
Reprosecution for a Higher Offense After Reversal
Suppose again that our hypothetical defendant
was indicated for first and second degree murder.
The jury convicts him of second degree murder
but is silent as to the first degree murder charge.
If the defendant's conviction is reversed on appeal,
may he be retried on the first degree murder
charge? What if both crimes involved completely
different elements of proof?
The states are in disagreement regarding re-
prosecution for a greater offense following re-
versal of a conviction of a lesser offense. Most
courts which allow the practice, and the Supreme
Court until 1957, when applying the Fifth Amend-
ment to federal cases, have adopted a theory of
"complete waiver." The term has been taken to
mean that the defendant's conviction of the lesser
offense and the jury's silence as to the greater
implies an acquittal of the greater. The defendant
upon appealing his prior conviction then relin-
quishes his constitutional right not to be retried
for the greater offense of which he was impliedly
acquitted.20 Aside from those arguments advanced
in opposition to the "waiver" theory as a rationale
from Ciucci because there the defendant had engaged
in four distinct acts, whereas the defendant's crime in
this case was the same at both trials; i.e. conspiring to
murder two men.
18 56 lI. App. 254, 206 N.E.2d 124 (1965).
19 Id. at 127.
20Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
Accord, Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158(1900), where the Court viewed the doctrine in this way:
As the judgement stands before appeal, it is a com-
plete bar to any further prosecution for the offense
set forth in the indictment, or of any lesser offense
thereof .... but if he chooses to appeal from it and
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for retrial, per se,n it might also be said that the
verdict at the first trial is not a single entity, as
this theory seems to assume, but serves in a dual
capacity; i.e. both as a conviction of the lesser
offense, and, according to traditional double
jeopardy principles, as a bar to a new prosecution
for the greater offense.2 That is to say, there
seems no logical reason for saying that a defendant
can't appeal a lesser offense without losing his
protection against being convicted for the greater.
The two crimes are completely separable.
The "complete waiver" theory has received
some support under circumstances where the
lesser offense is not' included within the greater;
that is, where there are different elements of
proof for each. In that case reversal without the
right to retry for the greater offense may be
tantamount to acquittal where the prosecution's
theory couldn't support conviction of the lesser
offense.n This is true, for example, where the jury
convicts the defendant of the lesser offense out
of sympathy for the prosecution where the facts
did not allow for such conviction. This argument,
however, does not seem to be supporting the
fiction of waiver, but rather the necessity of
allowing the prosecution to retry the defendant
for the greater offense. The answer, therefore,
does not seem to be in this judicially created
rationalization, but in a determination of the
situations in which society's interest in convicting
a criminal of a greater offense than that of which
he was originally convicted outweighs his interest
in being free from retrial of the greater offense.
Such a situation exists where the court has erred
in allowing the jury to convict of the lesser crime.
The courts which don't allow reprosecution for a
greater offense have utilized a "partial waiver"
theory.2 The idea, here, is that conviction of a
crime of a lesser degree than the greater crime,
and which is silent as to the other crimes included
to ask for its reversal he thereby waives, if successful,
his right to avail himself of the former acquittal of
the greater offense, contained in the judgement which
he has himself procurred to be reversed.
21 See, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
n2 Note, 66 YALE L.J. 592 (1957). Accord, Johnson v.
State 27 Fla. 245, 9 So. 208 (1891), where the court
analogized the situation to one where there are a num-
ber of defendants, some who are acquitted and others
who are convicted. According to traditional waiver
theory those who are acquitted would have to stand
trial again if the conviction of the others was reversed
and remanded.
2 Note, supra note 18, at 597.
24 See 61 A.L.R.2d 1146, where it is stated that 15
states adhere to the doctrine that the accused can, in
no case, be retried for the greater offense.
in the indictment is "an equally forceful and effec-
tive acquittal of the higher offense. The defendant
then waives his double jeopardy rights only as to
the crime he appeals.
2
5
Until 1957 the Supreme Court, when applying
the Fifth Amendment to federal reprosecutions,
advocated the "complete waiver" approach to the
problem.2 6 In Green v. United States27 the Court's
position was suddenly reversed. In that case the
accused was indicted in a federal court of first-
degree murder and arson. At trial the jury was
instructed as to first and second-degree murder
and arson, although second-degree murder is not
a lesser-included offense since it requires the
element of malice whereas first-degree murder does
not. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the
counts of second-degree murder and arson, but
was silent as to the first-degree murder charge.
The court of appeals reversed the second-degree
murder conviction on the basis of insufficiency
of the evidence and remanded. At the second trial
the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.
The Supreme Court reversed on the basis of
double jeopardy. First, it decided that under the
circumstances presented here most courts would
regard the first jury verdict as an implied acquittal
of the first-degree murder charge. It followed,
then, that in order to protect an individual from
being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible
conviction twice for the same offense, the prose-
cution must be denied the right to retry for first-
degree murder.29 Further, the "waiver" argument
is illogical since it implies a rational choice. No
such choice could be made here, the court con-
cluded, since it would be saying that a defendant,
in order to appeal an erroneous conviction of a
lesser offense, would be required to barter away
his constitutional right not to be reprosecuted of a
crime punishable by death, of which he was
impliedly acquitted. The law should not place
him in such an "incredible dilemma." 0 It has
also been submitted that the court in Green em-
21 See e.g., Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245, 9 So. 208
(1891). Accord, People v. Dowling, 84 N.Y. 478, 484
(1881), where the court declared, "His application for
a correction of the verdict is not to be taken as more
extensive than his needs.... The waiver is construed
to extend only to the precise thing concerning which
the relief is sought."26 Supra note 16.
27 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
8 D.C. Code, 1951, sections 22-401 and 22-2401
which provides that he who, without purpose to kill,
does so while perpetrating an arson is guilty of murder.
21 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
10 Id. at 193.
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ployed the double jeopardy clause principally as a
means of protecting Green's statutory right of
appeal rather than his right to be free from re-
peated prosecutions."
The result in Green has been criticized prin-
cipally on its assumption that the jury in the first
trial acquitted the defendant of first-degree murder
when, in fact, all the elements of that crime were
present.n It is evident then that the second-degree
murder conviction was an instance of jury leniency
and not under the circumstances, a sign of in-
nocence of the greater offense. If this is correct
then the trial judge, by erroneously instructing
on second-degree murder committed an error
prejudicial to the government, since, had it not
been so instructed, the jury may very well have
returned a verdict of guilty as to first-degree
murder. The conclusion to be reached is that
under these circumstances, i.e., where the mistake
of the trial court affected, to the government's
prejudice, the jury's determination of innocence
of the higher offense, society's interest in determin-
ing the defendant's guilt or innocence heavily
outweighs his. interest in being unconditionally
set free. Therefore, on remand the government
should not be precluded from reprosecuting the
defendant for first-degree murder.
An alternative approach to the problem was
used in one case, where, under similar facts, it
was held that since the defendant was not prej-
udiced by the instruction as to second-degree
murder he has no right to appeal and the original
verdict must stand.n The difficulty with that
argument is that we can not be sure what the
jury would have done had it not been instructed
31 Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 630 ".... while a
majority used a double jeopardy technique to reach
its result, its opinion principally bears down on the risk
of reprosecution in deterring access to post-conviction
remedies and not the alleged ordeal which a second
trial might portend."
3 Note, supra note 18, at 598. The jury found the
essential elements of first-degree murder when it con-
victed the defendant of arson and second-degree mur-
der. The court of appeals concluded that the deceased's
death was caused by fire set by the defendant. Green v.
United States, 218 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Circ. 1955).
The second-degree murder verdict was apparently an
instance of jury leniency and not, under the circum-
stances, a sign of innocence of the greater offense. Since
"the jury does not.., have the right to find a fact and
then refuse to render the verdict which such a finding
necessarily requires," [People v. Mussendin, 308 N.Y.
558,563, 127 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1955)], it could be argued
that the jury's silence should be interpreted as an
implied conviction rather than an implied acquittal.
State v. Gordon, 87 Ohio App. 8, 92 N.E.2d 305
(1948).
on second-degree murder. It may very well have
acquitted the defendant. If so, then there is
clearly a substantial error prejudicial to the de-
fendant's rights from which he can appeal, and
the basis for Green, the protection of the accused's
right to appeal, has some validity.U
In any case, when applied to the normal situ-
ation of a lesser-included offense, (where an error
is committed, clearly prejudicial to the defendant),
the doctrine espoused in Green is a desirable one.
Here society's interest in convicting the accused
is met, since, if the requisite elements of the lesser
offense are present at the second trial, he will be
convicted, while the defendant's access to post-
conviction remedies is in no way deterred.
Even though the Supreme Court has found it
it be a violation of the double jeopardy protection
to retry an accused for a greater offense in a federal
court, it has yet to extend such a ruling to state
reprosecutions.
The most recent case applying the Fourteenth
Amendment to a state reprosecution was United
States ex rel Hentenyi v. Wilkints3 5 The defendant
was indicted for first-degree murder. The jury,
instructed on first- and second-degree murder and
manslaughter, found the defendant guilty of
second-degree murder. On appeal the Appellate
Division of New York reversed and remanded for
a new trial on the basis that error had been com-
mitted in the trial court's charge relating to venue
and because of certain prejudicial comments by
the District Attorney. On retrial the accused was
charged with and convicted of first-degree murder,
but again the judgment was reversed on the basis
of the District Attorney's prejudicial conduct,
and a third trial was ordered. At this trial, as in
the other two, the defendant was indicted on
first-degree murder and the jury found him guilty
of second-degree murder. After seeking writs of
habeas corpus in both state and federal courts,
defendant's request was finally granted by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Judge Marshall, speaking for the majority,
held, first, that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes some limitations
on a state's power to reprosecute an individual
for the same crime. This conclusion was obtained
34 Also, the argument that "such a reprosecution was
cruel and inhuman imposing on the accused a 'hardship
so acute and shocking that our policy will not endure
it' " seems more realistic under this assumption. United





from a close scrutiny of Supreme Court decisions
which, although never holding such reprosecutions
unconstitutional, have shown some indication
that the Court would so hold if presented with
the problem. Assuming some limits, then, the
Court felt that this case transgressed them.
The reason for so holding is that no matter what
Fourteenth Amendment standard the Supreme
Court will eventually adopt, the facts presented
fall within such standard. If the validity of state
reprosecution procedures were determined by a
federal standard (which tests a conviction by the
Fifth Amendment directly) or the basic core
standard (where only the essential aspects of the
Fifth are applied) the decision in Green would
make the procedure in this case unconstitutional.
Even if a "fundamental fairness" approach were
adopted,36 this prosecution goes beyond the bounds
of such a test. This determination is based on the
"insecurity and anxiety, the opportunity for
harassment, and the marginal increase in the
probability of convicting the accused of a crime
he did not commit by simply trying him again
. .. " - The court decided, finally, that even though
the accused was convicted only of second-degrees
murder, of which he was originally indicted, his
conviction was still a violation of due process
because: (1) there was a reasonable probability
that the conduct of the trial and the jury verdict
were affected by the defendant's conviction of
first-degree murder and the fact that he was
presently charged with the crime; and (2) the
state was constitutionally forbidden from prose-
cuting defendant for first-degree murder following
completion of the first trial.
This decision obviously goes farther than any
previous case regarding state reprosecution for a
greater offense, and, if accepted by the Supreme
Court, would result in the overruling of contrary
decisions and statutes in nearly half the states.
The viewpoint expressed by the court has, however,
received considerable support as being consistent
with the Supreme Court's concern in giving the
36 This test seems to be required by the decision in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See Henkin,
Selective Incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment,
73 YALE L.J. 74. The author contends that Cardozo,
"expressly reserved the possibility that some parts of
the federal protection against double jeopardy might-if
you will-be incorporated in due process... ", when the
abuse of defendant's rights is so flagrant as to require
recognition by the court.37 United States ex rel Hentenyi v. Wilkins, 348
F.2d 844, 858 (1965).
accused a fair trial.n Furthermore, such a pro-
mulgation by a federal court is clearly in line
with the policy behind the double jeopardy pro-
hibition in disallowing unreasonable reprosecu-
tions,39 or as was stated in one case, we should
not allow the state, "to do better a second time" 41
unless there is some overriding societal interest.
Even assuming the validity of this decision,
there is still a question of how the Supreme Court
will extend the double jeopardy protection to the
States. According to the doctrine of selective
incorporation the Supreme Court selects those
provisions of the Bill of Rights which it deems
fundamental and absorbs them whole and intact
into the Fourteenth Amendment. In the last few
years this theory has become increasingly popular
with the Court,4' and it is likely to be extended to
the double jeopardy freedom. Also, adminis-
tration of this standard would be the easiest of
any method since the States would be obliged to
follow the federal court's interpretation of the
protection, whereas under a "fundamental
fairness" approach the courts will have to look
at the facts in each case to determine whether they
violate those "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which are at the base of all our civil
and political institutions." 4 The advantage of
the "fundamental fairness" test is that it allows
for a degree of flexibility because the court can
judge the facts in light of changing concepts as
to minimum standards of fairness.4 In any case,
the court in Wilkins recognized that under any
standard a similar practice as that employed here
would be unconstitutional."
38 Note, 18 S. CAP. L.REv. 328, 330 (1966). The view-
point is here expressed that if the rationale for Green
is that reprosecution for a greater offense "was found
to place an unconscionable limitation on a 'vital societal
interest', assuring the accused a fair trial, free from
legal error prejudicing his substantive rights," then
the dilemma in which the defendant finds himself is
no less incredible because it occurred in a state court.
39 But see, Abstract, 57 J. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 60,
62 (1966), where the author puts forth the argument
that if it is fundamentally unfair to retry the defendant
here for first-degree murder and if it is cruel and in-
human to do so, then it is equally unfair to retry him
for the fourth time for any offense. "Why must he
endure four trials for murder only because the errors
of the state voided three previous trials?"
40 Brock v. State, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
41 See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S., 400 (1965),
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), Malloy v.
Hogan 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
4Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
43 Note, WAYNE LAW REvrEw, 685, 691 (1966).




Reprosecution and Conviction with a Higher Penalty
After Reversal
In a final situation assume that our defendant
is indicted and convicted of first-degree murder
but is only sentenced to life imprisonment. On
appeal his conviction is reversed and remanded
for a new trial. He is again found guilty of the
same offense but this time is sentenced to death.
What are the policy considerations under these
circumstances? Are they the same as where he is
convicted of a greater crime on retrial?
One authority has noted that the law is settled
that, after a reversal of a prior conviction, a
defendant may again be tried for the same offense,
even if a more severe penalty is given.45 This
notion is based on the traditional doctrine ex-
pressed in Stroud v. United States.46 There, the,
defendant, after having a murder conviction and
life sentence reversed and a retrial granted, was
found guilty of murder with no recommendation
for dispensing with capital punishment. The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, stating
that there was no double jeopardy problem since
all the trials were for the same offense.
The vitality of the decision in Stroud has been
greatly diminished since the Court relied on a
prior decision, Trono v. United States,a which held
that prosecution for a greater offense than that
of which the defendant was originally tried is
permissible after reversal of the theory of
"waiver". The case has since been impliedly
overruled by the Court in Green,43 although it
made a feeble attempt to distinguish Trono from
the facts before it. It has also been argued that,
since the Court in Green was concerned with the
effect of reprosecution on deterring access to
post-conviction remedies, this reasoning is similarly
applicable to the facts in Stroud and that it should
be expressly overruled. 49
The modern trend in state resentencing cases
is exemplified by Poeple v. Henderson.50 In that
case the defendant was tried and convicted of
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The
appellate court reversed and remanded and, on
45 61 A.L.R.2d 1141, 1143.
46 251 U.S. 15 (1919). Accord, People v. Grill, 151
Cal. 592, 91 P. 515 (1907).
4 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
48 The court attempted to distinguish Trono on the
basis that the court there was viewing the problem
simply as an interpretation of a statute, even though
this was expressly denied by the Trono court.
49 Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 630.10 60 Cal. 2d 486, 386 P.2d 677 (1963).
retrial, the defendant was found guilty and sen-
tenced to death. The California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that reasoning similar to that
set forth in Green is applicable to a case of dif-
ferent punishments.5  In his dissent Justice
Sauer sharply criticized the majority for relying
on Green, since there the decision was based on an
implied acquittal of the greater offense, whereas
the court in Green expressly distinguished the
facts before it from those where a greater punish-
ment is given on retrial. The dissent concluded
by pointing out the fallacy in the majority's
statement that there is no difference between the
legislature's dividing a crime into degrees, each
carrying a different punishment, and the court or
jury dispensing different punishment for the same
offense. This argument "overlooks the funda-
mental principle that even though different
degrees of a crime refer to a common name, each
of those degrees is in fact a different offense
requiring proof of different elements for con-
viction." 52
Granting the logic behind the dissent's argu-
ments, the fact remains that, unless such a rule
as laid down here is accepted, defendants will be
dissuaded from appealing merely because of the
threat of greater penalty. Further, if what we
are seeking to prevent are unreasonable reprose-
cutions, then such a policy is inconsistent with
stricter penalties on retrial, because, if allowed,
it would be giving the prosecution a second chance
to get a higher penalty just because of its own
mistake.
Conclusion. The Supreme Court in double
jeopardy situations has again relied on the familiar
balancing of interest approach to the problem
even though outwardly claiming certain fictions
to be the basis for their decisions.
It has long been established in this country
that once a verdict has been reversed the defendant
may be retried for the same offense. The courts
have attempted to rationalize this result by the
erection of certain theories which in most cases
have proved to be unworkable. In the final analysis
51 Id. at 497, where the court stated that insofar
as the basic purposes of double jeopardy are concerned,
there doesn't seem to be any difference between a divi-
sion of a crime into different degrees by the legislature
or a selection among alternative punishments by thejury. In either case the jury is making a decision to
convict of one crime with a specific penalty and not
another.
52 People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 486, 503, 386
P.2d 677, 684 (1963).
